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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020966-CA

vs.
RICHARD F. NORRIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from unconditional guilty pleas to three counts of communications
fraud, all third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. By pleading guilty unconditionally, did defendant waive his right to challenge the
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute?
Standard of Review. "The determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no
deference to the district court's determination." Beaver v. Quest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, ^ 8, 31
P.3d 1147. "Questions of the scope of judicial authority are reviewed for correctness."
Oliphant v. Estate ofBrunettU 2002 UT App 375, % 7, 64 P.3d 587.

2. Is the communications fraud statute unconstitutionally overbroad and vague in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution?
Standard of Review. Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, *| 5,
— Utah Adv. Rep. —. "When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the
statute is valid, and [will] resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." State
v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, % 6, 980 P.2d 191.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than
$1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less
than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1)
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).
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(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing
of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act
and offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to
talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and
spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 26, 1998, defendant was charged by information with seven counts of
communications fraud. R. 1-8; see also R. 106-12. Following a preliminary hearing,
defendant was bound over for trial on all seven counts, three as second degree felonies, three
as third degree felonies, and one as a class A misdemeanor. R. 125-27. The State later filed
an amended information, omitting the class A misdemeanor offense. R. 210-14; 750-54.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized by the State pursuant to a search
warrant. R. 207,228-39. The trial court granted defendant's motion, ruling that the warrant
was overbroad. R. 291-302,359-60,365-69,384-89. The Utah Supreme Court reversed that
ruling on interlocutory appeal. R. 440, 584-90; State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 48 P.3d 872.
While the case was pending on interlocutory appeal, defendant moved for an order
dismissing the case for the State's alleged failure to comply with his 120-day disposition
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demand. R. 453-61. The trial court denied defendant's motion and this Court denied
defendant's petition for permission to appeal that denial. R. 546-47, 558-65, 583A.
On the first day of defendant's jury trial, the State filed an amended information
charging defendant with five counts of communications fraud, three as second degree
felonies and two as third degree felonies. R. 750-54. On the third day of trial, the State
rested and defendant called two witnesses in his case-in-chief. See R. 761-64; R. 871, 87475. The following day, defendant waived his trial rights and pled guilty unconditionally to
three counts of communications fraud, all third degree felonies. R. 765-72; R. 872.
Defendant was later sentenced to indeterminate prison terms of zero-to-five years on each
count. R. 791-93. The trial court suspended the sentences and placed defendant on
supervised probation for 36 months. R. 792-93. Among the conditions of probation,
defendant was ordered to serve 270 days in jail, pay restitution, and sign satisfactions of
judgment for his victims. R. 791. Defendant filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry
of the judgment. R. 797-98.1

The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to resolution of the
issues on appeal and the State therefore does not give a detailed statement of those facts.
Suffice it to say that defendant devised a scheme or artifice to defraud R&R Drywall,
Durham Plumbing, and Foote Insurance by means of false or fraudulent pretences,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted intentionally, knowingly,
or with reckless disregard for the truth. See R. 771 (Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Waiver of Constitutional Claim. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute, claiming that it is impermissibly overbroad and vague. By
pleading guilty unconditionally, defendant waived all nonjurisdictional issues. The issue of
whether the communications fraud statute is overbroad or vague is not jurisdictional in
nature. Defendant thus waived his right to raise this issue on appeal.
Overbreadth. Even assuming arguendo that the constitutionality of the statute is
jurisdictional in nature, defendant's claim fails. He does not contend that he was engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct, but claims that the statute is overbroad and cannot thus
apply to him or anyone else. To prevail on an overbreadth claim, defendant must
demonstrate that the overbreadth is both real and substantial. He cannot do so. The statute
limits its reach to misrepresentations made intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth. Such speech is not protected by the First Amendment. As a result,
defendant has shown no overbreadth, let alone substantial overbreadth.
Vagueness. Defendant also claims that the statute is vague. Because the statute
implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, defendant must demonstrate that the statute
is vague in all its applications. Defendant cannot do so because he admitted that he devised a
"scheme or artifice" to defraud subcontractors of "money" and executed that scheme by
"communicating" to them intentional falsehoods. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)
(Supp. 1995). There is nothing vague in the terms "artifice," "communicate," or "anything
ofvalue."
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ARGUMENT
I.

IN PLEADING GUILTY UNCONDITIONALLY TO THREE COUNTS
OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT
TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 76-101801
The law is well settled that "by pleading guilty, [a] defendant is deemed to have

admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." State v.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).2 Defendant does not dispute
this waiver rule and acknowledges that he pled guilty unconditionally to three counts of
communications fraud. Aplt. Brf. at 31. He nevertheless attempts to avoid the waiver rule
by calling his constitutional challenge a jurisdictional claim. Aplt. Brf. at 31-33. This
attempt must fail.
This Court's decision in State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, 54 P.3d 645, is
dispositive. In that case, Hardy pled guilty unconditionally to one misdemeanor count of
violating a protective order. Id. at f 3. The trial court initially held Hardy's guilty plea in
abeyance, but subsequently accepted the plea after finding that Hardy had committed further
violations. Id. at ^ 4-6. Hardy appealed his conviction, claiming that the protective order

2

A defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea on the ground that it was not
entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278. To do so, however, he
must file a timely motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^f 3,40 P.3d 630.
A "failure to do so extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the guilty plea on appeal."
Id. Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea and has not challenged its validity on
appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 33.
6

statutes were "overly broad and impermissibly vague in violation of the United States
Constitution." Id. at % 8. This Court refused to address Hardy's constitutional challenge to
the statutes. Id. at f 13. Quoting Parsons, the Court held that '"[b]y pleading guilty, the
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional
violations.'" Id. (quoting Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the
holding in Hardy, defendant likewise waived any challenge to the constitutionality of section
76-10-1801 when he pled guilty unconditionally to the three counts of communications

fraud.
Although Hardy forecloses defendant's constitutional challenge, defendant does not
acknowledge it, much less attempt to make the showing necessary to justify overruling it.
See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994). Instead, he cites one federal
decision in support of his claim that "a statute's unconstitutional vagueness is a jurisdictional
defect." Aplt. Brf. at 32. He does not explain the reasoning of that decision or why it should
be adopted in Utah. See Aplt. Brf. at 32-33. He simply asks this court to reverse a rule that
has been applied in Utah for decades. To do so would reverse a host of decisions requiring
that challenges to the validity of a statute be preserved in the trial court.

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the information charging him with
communications fraud, alleging that it too is jurisdictional in nature and thus not waivable.
Aplt. Brf. at 32. However, the Utah Supreme Court "ha[s] repeatedly held that 'failure to
object at trial to alleged defects in the information constitutes waiver of the opportunity to
challenge its contents on appeal.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, \ 30, 974 P.2d 269
(citations omitted).
7

Indeed, persons whose convictions rest on a guilty plea are subject to the same
preservation requirements for challenging the validity of a statute as are those whose
convictions rest on a guilty verdict following trial. See, e.g., State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d
688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995) (holding that defendant could not challenge the
constitutionality of statute because he did not raise the issue at trial); State v. Brown, 856
P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993) (same); In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah App. 1989) (same);
State v. Laird, 601 P.2d 926, 927 & n.6 (Utah 1979) (same); State v. Tritt, 23 Utah2d 365,
463 P.2d 806 (1970) (same). In both types of cases, our courts have required that the issue
be preserved below. There is no reason to treat them differently. Thus, had defendant gone
forward with trial and been convicted, he likewise would have been precluded from
challenging the validity of the statute because he did not raise that issue at any time below.
Moroever, defendant's claim that the constitutionality of a statute is jurisdictional in
nature melts under the heat of review. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority
of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed." Thompson v.
Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis added). "A court has subject
matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court has been empowered to
entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court derives its authority." In re
Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added). Thus, a
court's subject matter jurisdiction is not dependent on the constitutionality of the statutes it
may be called upon to enforce, but upon the constitutional and statutory authority conferred
upon it.
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Utah district courts derive their jurisdiction from both the Utah Constitution and the
Utah Code. Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[tjhe judicial
power of the state shall be vested . . . in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
district court." Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1. Section 78-3-4 provides that "[t]he district court
has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 2000). As a
criminal offense under the Utah Criminal Code, section 76-10-1801 is therefore "one of the
type of cases" the Fourth District Court is "empowered to entertain," whether or not it may
later be found to be unconstitutional. See In re Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d at 681-82.
* * *

Because the constitutional validity of a statute is not jurisdictional and because
defendant pled guilty unconditionally, he has waived his constitutional challenge.
II.

SECTION 76-10-1801 IS NEITHER
OVERBROAD NOR VAGUE

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

Even assuming arguendo that the constitutionality of the statute is jurisdictional in
nature, defendant's claim fails. "In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a
law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494,102 S.Ct. 1186,1191 (1982); accord Logan City v. Huber,
786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1990). If it does, the statute will be deemed invalid for
overbreadth and the Court need not reach the vagueness challenge. "If it does not, then the
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overbreadth challenge must fail [and] [t]he court should then examine the facial vagueness
challenge. . . ." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S at 494-95,102 S.Ct. at 1191; accord Huber, 786
P.2d at 1375. Section 76-10-1801 is neither overbroad nor vague.
A.

SECTION

76-10-1801 Is NOT OVERBROAD

Defendant does not contend that he was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct. See Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. Instead, he claims that the communications fraud statute
under which he was convicted is overbroad under the First Amendment and cannot therefore
be applied to him or anyone else. Aplt. Brf. at 21-24. His claim fails.
1. The Overbreadth Doctrine
As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may
not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102
S.Ct. 3348, 3360 (1982). The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to
this general rule, applied to statutes "that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the
constitutionally protected speech of third parties." Members of the City Council of the City
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 (1984).
Statutory overbreadth, therefore, "is a substantive due process question which addresses the
issue of whether the statute is so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior
but may also prohibit protected activity as well.'" State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192
(Utah 1987) (citation omitted).
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The social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine are great—invalidating "all
enforcement" of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 2196-97 (2003) (quotation and
citation omitted). The overbreadth doctrine is thus "employed [ ] with hesitation, and then
c

only as a last resort.'" Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. at 3361 (quoting Broadrick v.

Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973)). Consequently, courts "afford
statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will, whenever possible, construe a
statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities." I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT110, ^125,61
P.3d 1038. A statute will not be deemed facially invalid "when a limiting construction
. .. could be placed on the challenged statute" or a portion of the statute could be severed
without disturbing the purpose of the statute. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916;
accordProvo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86,ffif8, 14, 1 P.3d 1113.
Because the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613,93
S.Ct. at 2916, "[o]nly a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its
face," City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 (1987) (emphasis
added). It is not enough "that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a
statute." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800, 104 S.Ct. at 2126. The overbreadth must
be real and substantial. Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564, 584, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1713
(2002) (citingBroadrick, 413 U.S. at 615,93 S.Ct. 2908). This is "particularly [true] where
conduct and not merely speech is involved," as is the case here. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615,
93 S.Ct. at 2918.
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A person claiming overbreadth "bears the burden of demonstrating, 'from the text of
[the law] and from actual fact,' that substantial overbreadth exists." Id. (quoting New York
State Club Ass% Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14, 108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988)). The
claimant must demonstrate that the statute, "taken as a whole, is substantially overbroad
judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep." Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. at 2198
(emphasis in original). "In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the
Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. at 801, 104 S.Ct. at 2126 (emphasis added). Defendant has demonstrated no such
danger.
2. The Statute Reaches Only Unprotected Speech
On the one hand, defendant argues that section 76-10-1801 requires "no intent to
defraud, just a desire to obtain something of value" and that the elements of the statutes are
satisfied "[a]s long as there is an artifice, a false communication in any form made for the
purpose of executing the artifice, and a desire to obtain anything of value." Aplt. Brf. at 2122. On the other hand, defendant correctly acknowledges that the statute requires that the
falsity or material omission be made or omitted with at least a reckless disregard for the
truth. See Aplt. Brf. at 21. Indeed, mere proof that a communication is false is not
sufficient. The statute requires a showing that the false communication was made with the
requisite fraudulent intent—that is, proof that "the [false or fraudulent] pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
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intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregardfor the truth" Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801(7) (emphasis added).
Defendant nevertheless derides the statute's reach to falsities made with "only [ ] a
reckless disregard for the truth/' baldly claiming that such a mental state is common in
editorials, political speech, and commercial advertising. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. He posits three
hypothetical examples where the communications fraud statute could assertedly impinge on
protected speech under this mental state: (1) an advertiser who suggests that consumers who
buy the advertised product will be attractive; (2) an editorialist who writes falsehoods to
create public controversy; and (3) a political candidate who misrepresents his position on
abortion to obtain votes. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. These hypotheticals are inapposite for varied
reasons.4 However, the State need not examine those reasons because defendant's claim fails
at its inception. It rests on a faulty premise, i.e., that the government may not sanction false
speech made with only a reckless disregard for the truth.
"Untruthful speech . . . has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State
Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771,96 S.Ct.
1817, 1830 (1976). The Supreme Court has nevertheless held that the First Amendment
affords a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order to provide the breathing space

4

E.g., "the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speeech," Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 496-97, 102 S.Ct. at 1192; the editorialist does not "obtain" possession
of a controversy "from" anyone; and a political position or opinion is not a representation of
fact subject to the statute, cf West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1014-15 (Utah
1994) (holding that opinions cannot form the basis of a defamation claim because they are
not factual assertions capable of verification).
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necessary for the exercise of fully protected speech, or "speech that matters." BE & K
Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536U.S. 516,531,122 S.Ct 2390,2399 (2002)(quotingGertz
v. Robert Welsh Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341-42,94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974)) (emphasis added mBE &
K).

Courts have made clear, however, that the "breathing space" does not extend to

falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726 (1964) (holding
that public officials may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood unless it can be
proven that the falsehood was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not"); I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, ^| 13 (acknowledging
falsehoods may be sanctioned if they are made knowingly or recklessly); State v. Frampton,
131 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987) (holding that "neither the Utah nor the United States
constitution protects acts made with the intent to defraud . . . . " ) .
Because the communications fraud statute limits its reach to false speech made with at
least a reckless disregard for the truth, its reach does not extend to protected speech.
Defendant has not, therefore, demonstrated that the communications fraud statute is
"susceptible of application to substantial amounts of [protected] speech." Logan City v.
Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah App. 1990). His overbreadth claim therefore fails.
B.

SECTION

76-10-1801 Is NOT VAGUE

A law that is not facially overbroad "may nevertheless be challenged on its face as
unduly vague, in violation of due process." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497, 102 S.Ct. at
1193. Defendant claims that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague in
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its use of three terms: (1) "artifice," (2) "communicate," and (3) "anything of value." Aplt.
Brf. at 25. There is nothing vague about these terms.
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983).
Vagueness claims, therefore, "'are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct.'" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 14, —
Utah Adv. Rep.— (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92). "If a statute '"is sufficiently
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited,'" it is not
unconstitutionally vague." Id. (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 191-92) (quoting State v.
Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)).
Moreover, where the statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," the
Court will "uphold the challenge only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95,102 S.Ct. at 1191 (emphasis added). In
such cases, the statute "must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand." Id, at 495
n.7, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 n.7. As a result, a defendant whose conduct clearly falls within a
challenged statute cannot prevail on a vagueness challenge. Id. at 495 n.7,102 S.Ct. at 1191
n.7.
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As noted above, section 76-10-1801 implicates no constitutionally protected conduct.
Defendant must therefore demonstrate that the statute "is impermissibly vague in "a// of its
applications." Id. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 (emphasis added). This he has failed to do.
1. "Artifice"
Defendant first contends that the term "artifice" is vague. Aplt. Brf. at 25. Although
"artifice" is not defined under the statute, it is commonly understood as a "trick" or "a wily
or artful stratagem." Webster's Third New Infl Dictionary 124 (1993). Defendant
concedes that "artifice" is subject to such a common meaning, but complains that it
encompasses any form or device of dishonesty. Aplt. Brf. at 25. Such a complaint,
however, goes not to the vagueness of the term, but to the scope or reach of the term. As
held by the Utah Supreme Court, "a statute is not unconstitutionally vague [simply] because
it is broad." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). The question is "whether
the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." Id. Because "artifice" is a term
understood by "ordinary people," it is not vague, as applied to defendant or otherwise.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. at 1858.
2. "Communicate"
Defendant also contends that the term "communicate" is vague because it is "given
the broadest possible definition under the statute."

Aplt. Brf. at 25.

The term

"communicate" is specifically defined under the statute to include all forms of
communication. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6). However, as already noted, the
broad use of a term does not make it vague. See Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966.
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3. "Anything of Value"
Finally, defendant contends that "anything of value" is unconstitutionally vague and
posits hypotheticals where the "[ ]thing of value" could include everything from a "wife's
goodwill," an affair with another woman, a break from studies, or avoidance of an arrest.
Aplt. Brf. at 25-28. "c[T]here is little doubt that imagination can conjure up hypothetical
cases in which the meaning of [value] will be in nice question.'" Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703,733,120 S.Ct. 2480,2498 (2000) (quoting American Communications Assn. v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 412, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950)). However, the object of defendant's fraud in this
case was the obtaining of "money," see R. 45-9, and he has not argued that the term "money"
is unconstitutionally vague, see Aplt. Brf. at 24-31. Therefore, the statute clearly applies to
defendant's conduct and his vagueness challenge must fail. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S.
at 495 n.7, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 n.7 (holding that "'[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly
applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness'").5
* * *

5

Defendant also complains that under subsections (2) and (5) of the statute, the State
could both aggregate the value of the things sought to be obtained for purposes of enhancing
the degree of the offense and charge the defendant with separate counts for each separate
communication. See Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. Defendant's ability to correctly interpret the statute
belies his claim that these provisions are vague. Defendant also complains that the trial court
did not grant his request for a bill of particulars. Aplt. Brf. at 30. This complaint has
nothing to do with his claim that the statute is unconstitutional. Because he entered an
unconditional guilty plea and because he did not move to withdraw that plea, he cannot raise
it now on appeal. See Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (holding that a defendant waives all
nonjurisdictional defects upon pleading guilty).
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Because the communications fraud statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague, defendant's jurisdictional claim, even if it were valid, would fail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
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